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ABSTRACT 
ELIZABETH POTTER: Migration Patterns to Russia From Central Asia and the Baltics 
Since Independence 
 This paper examines migration trends in the former Soviet Union with a focus on 
migration inflows to the Russian Federation since independence. Four countries, three in 
Central Asia and one as an example of the broader trends in the Baltic countries, Estonia, 
have been selected for a more thorough analysis. The political and economic conditions 
since the dissolution of the Soviet Union are assessed for each of these countries and 
Russia using economic data and internationally recognized political measures. Although 
there are similarities on how economic and political factors affect migration and broad 
characterizations of migration periods can be established for the region such as Andrei 
Korobkov‟s categorization, migration to Russia is frequently politically or ethnically 
motivated, although economic reasons offer a viable alternative in certain cases. 
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1. An Overview of Migration in the Former Soviet Union 
a. Introduction 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of independent states created 
an entirely new pattern of migration in the region as what was formerly internal migration 
became migration across international borders. Whereas individuals used to migrate 
across borders of all Soviet Republics within the Soviet Union, immediately after 
independence, the majority of migration was destined for the Russian Federation. After 
the United States, Russia has the second largest migrant population in the world with 
estimates ranging from seven to 12 million migrants in 2005.
1
 Of those migrants, an 
estimated four to seven million of them are labor migrants and 80 percent of the total 
come from Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries.
2
 Migration within the 
CIS maintains an intra-regional characteristic largely due to shared history, common 
cultural ties, similar educational systems and corresponding labor markets. Migration 
trends of the last twenty years in the region of the former Soviet Union reflect the 
political and economic developments of the region.  
 This paper analyzes migration trends in the former Soviet Union with a focus on 
migration inflows to the Russian Federation since independence. It developed from an 
earlier project that compared language policy effects on migration of ethnic minorities 
from Kyrgyzstan and Latvia. Because of these countries‟ language policies, four 
countries, three in Central Asia and one as an example of the broader trends in the Baltic 
countries, Estonia, have been selected for a more thorough analysis on migration. The 
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political and economic conditions since the dissolution of the Soviet Union are reviewed 
for each of these countries and Russia using economic data and internationally 
recognized political measures. Although there are similarities on how economic and 
political factors affect migration and broad characterizations of migration periods can be 
established for the region, migration trends to Russia from the Baltic countries and 
Central Asia differ vastly between each of these countries. When migration rates are 
compared to political events in these countries, support for the theory that migration is 
based on political factors is found in some periods, although only initially for Estonia.  
 Individual, structural and economic theories of migration all present different 
aspects of migration, but no single theory can accurately predict or analyze migration in 
all cases. In the cases of the former Soviet Union, migration trends initially seem driven 
by political and ethnic factors throughout the 1990s, but not in all cases. By the turn of 
the century, however, migration rates had leveled off indicating the diminishing 
importance of political considerations, especially in the Baltics. 
 Because of the major political and economic transitions in the former countries of 
the Soviet Union in 1991, this region presents a unique case study on migration. These 
countries have long faced challenges in accurately recording migration flows due to the 
dissolution of the Soviet propiska system (registration of people); open border policies 
between CIS countries through most of the 1990s, which resulted in an increase in the 
number of unregistered migrants; and a lack of resources or political will for accurate 
statistical systems. Although sources of statistics from former Soviet countries are not 
always reliable, they can be used to observe general trends in migration when data from 
multiple sources is collected to check reliability or make a comparison. Due to 
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availability of data, this paper will focus on inflows to Russia from Central Asia and the 
Baltic countries rather than outflows of migration from Central Asia. 
 In the 2008 book Migration, Homeland and Belonging in Eurasia, editors Cynthia 
Buckley and Blair Ruble discuss the overall strengths and weaknesses of approaches to 
migration theory as they relate to the countries of the former Soviet Union. The authors 
highlight the strengths of neoclassical approaches that evaluate migration on a micro 
level and account for family strategies and risk management as part of the decision why 
people choose to migrate or to stay. Neoclassical theory also looks at realistic causal 
factors including age, health, gender, class and family status. Buckley and Ruble draw 
attention to the limitations of approaches that tend to emphasize ethnic identity as the sole 
motivation of migration in post-Soviet cases because it devalues the importance of 
individual characteristics and their relationship to agency, since a focus on ethnic identity 
limits the ability to weigh other factors in comparison.
3
 However, based on trends in the 
former Soviet Union, emphasis on structural political conditions (such as ethnic tension) 
affecting individuals are relevant to migration. 
 Initial migration trends after independence seemed to indicate that migration in 
the region was primarily driven by political factors, such as nationalism, ethnic conflicts 
or civil wars, discriminatory language policy, concentration of power in the hands of 
elites of the titular majority and redistribution of property. A desire for security and 
political control by the titular nationality led to discriminatory policies against non-titular 
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ethnic groups, primarily against ethnic Russians, within Central Asia and the Baltic 
countries which caused widespread migration in the early 1990s.
4
 
 Post-Soviet inflow migration to the Russian Federation can be classified into four 
divergent periods, which are adapted from researcher Andrei V. Korobkov‟s 
categorization of migration trends in the former Soviet Union from his 2007 article 
“Migration Trends in Central Eurasia: Politics versus Economics”.5 Although Korobkov 
analyzes migration data from all former Soviet Union countries, excluding the Baltic 
countries, the scope of this paper will be limited to Central Asia including Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Estonia (Estonia is included as an example of the Baltic 
migration patterns). Korobkov used these migration periods as an organizational method 
to create a foundation for predictions of potential ethnic conflict caused by migration and 
demographic change. Using economic, political and migration data, I aim to improve his 
categorization to make it more nuanced on a country level rather than to broadly assert 
that either political or economic factors played the decisive role for migration decisions 
in a certain period. However, this research does not call into question his conclusion 
about the possibility of ethnic conflict. Additionally, I will look closer at the ethnic 
makeup of outmigration and examine how different groups could migrate for different 
reasons. 
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 Korobkov delineates five periods of post-Soviet migration.
6
 For the purpose of 
presenting data in this paper, the first two periods will be combined because of their 
relative similarities. According to Korobkov‟s classification, the first period lasted from 
1991-1992 when the intensity of migration was similar to the high level of the late 1980s. 
This wave primarily included mass migration back to titular homelands, not limited to 
Russia as a destination, and was driven by political and ethnic considerations. The second 
period from 1993 through 1995 is characterized by fewer people leaving Russia, but the 
Russian Federation still gaining large inflows of migrants from the newly independent 
states, mainly ethnic Russians. Ethnic considerations, such as the strict language law 
passed in Kazakhstan still drove migrants to leave former Soviet Union states. Since 
inflow rates to Russia remained high through both periods and this analysis is primarily 
limited to migration inflows to Russia, period one lasts from 1991 until 1995 for this 
thesis. 
 Korobkov‟s third period lasted from 1996 through 1999 and was a period of 
relative stability (here forth known as the second period). He asserts that the role of 
socioeconomic factors and political factors declined leading to lower rates of migration. 
This period is characterized by the reverse role of political factors leading to lower 
migration and the increasing importance of economic factors.
7
 However, I contend that 
although economic factors began to be more important in some cases such as Estonia, 
political factors still drove migration from Central Asia given the political advantages 
that Russia offered. 
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 The fourth period (here forth known as the third period) lasted from 2000 until 
2004 when Vladimir Putin developed migration policy for Russia that attempted to 
organize migration by strengthening law enforcement. Korobkov contends that shrinking 
migration rates were partially due to migration policy. Fewer migrants self-reported that 
their reasons for going to the Russian Federation were because of ethnic tension in their 
country of origin.
8
 However, using data on the ethnic composition of migration to Russia, 
migrants from Central Asia were still not of the titular majority, indicating that migrants 
may still be affected by political and ethnic considerations. Additionally, using research 
by Richard Wolfel, I contend that migration policy in Russia only moderately affects 
migration rates and does not affect migration from Estonia at all. 
 Korobkov‟s fifth period began in 2005 through 2009 (in this paper, the fourth 
period). Migration policies in Russia were somewhat liberalized in order to increase 
permanent migration over seasonal or labor migration. Migration policies in Russia were 
relaxed because leaders of the Russian Federation acknowledged the severity of the 
demographic crisis affecting the country due to low birth rates and higher than the 
average OECD country death rates. Changes in migration policy included simplification 
of registration in Russia, incentives for skilled migrants and incentives for long-term 
migration. According to Korobkov, the period is characterized by fewer people deciding 
to immigrate for political reasons and a greater number of people choosing to migrate due 
to economic considerations. Political and economic evidence reviewed in this thesis 
supports Korobkov‟s description of the fourth period, although continued low migration 
from Estonia where unemployment rates were higher than Russia, indicates the 
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importance of political rights and liberties despite some discrimination against ethnic 
minorities. 
 Throughout this thesis, several types of data are used in the characterization of 
migration, including annual flows of migrants and measures of economic and political 
conditions. The 1989 population data on which most of the migration rate calculations are 
based come from the Soviet Union‟s census. This dataset also lists the ethnic composition 
of each country. Migration inflows to Russia from each Central Asian and Baltic country 
are compiled by the Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat). Many of these data 
are published in a report known as the “Demographic Yearbook of Russia” 
(Демографический Ежегодник России) accessed through the Universal Database of 
Russian Governmental Publications. The CIA World Factbook was also a source of 
information on the size of various ethnic populations in different countries. In the 
category of economic data, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provides annual data 
for nearly every country of the world, including any GDP-related measures used in this 
thesis. Assessments of political conditions in various countries are made by several 
NGOs which seek to promote freedom and/or human rights. Freedom House‟s Freedom 
in the World report lists numerical ratings of political freedom in two measures: political 
rights and civil liberties. Transparency International publishes another measure related to 
the quality of governance called the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which is based 
upon surveys of public perceptions in various countries. 
 In the tables below, the migration rates for countries in Central Asia and the 
Baltic countries are listed according to Korobkov‟s periods of post-Soviet migration.  
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Table 1: Average Migration Rates to Russia (per thousand) 
Country Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Kazakhstan 15.31 13.51 4.15 2.66 
Kyrgyzstan 14.12 3.10 2.25 3.92 
Tajikistan 10.42 4.23 1.04 2.23 
Estonia 9.32 2.36 0.35 0.29 
Latvia 8.80 2.17 0.43 0.28 
Lithuania 3.22 0.56 0.18 0.12 
Source: Russian Demographic Yearbook (Демографический Ежегодник России) 
Note: the rates for Central Asia are based on population estimates based on the 1989 and the 
most recent census data; the rates for the Baltic countries are based only on 1989 census data. 
  
 Although Korobkov‟s categorization of migration generally describes post-Soviet 
migration for the entire former Soviet region, based on Table 1 above, it does not hold 
true for all of the Central Asian republics. Where migration rates from Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan increased somewhat in 2005, the migration rate from Kazakhstan actually 
decreased; whereas in period two, migration from Kazakhstan does not decrease in the 
same way as from Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This divergence in migration patterns can 
be observed in Figure 1 below.  The periods are delineated by the vertical dashed lines. 
Figure 1: Migration Inflows from Central Asia to Russia, 1992-2009 
 
Source: Russian Demographic Yearbook (Демографический Ежегодник России) 
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 Although the Baltics were not directly addressed in his analysis, Korobkov‟s 
categorization fails to accurately describe migration trends from the Baltic countries to 
the Russian Federation. Although initial migration to Russia from independent Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania was largely similar to Central Asia, migration rates from Lithuania 
were almost flat by 1996 and by 1999 from Latvia and Estonia and have remained flat 
since then, regardless of economic and political changes in those countries. Even the 
2005 liberalization in Russian migration policies that Korobkov attests led to increases in 
some Central Asian migration did not seem to affect migration from the Baltic countries 
to Russia as depicted by Figure 2 below. There is clearly a divergence in migration 
behavior beginning around 1996 in certain regions of the former Soviet Union.  
Figure 2: Migration Inflows from the Baltics to Russia, 1992-2009 
 
b. The Case of Ethnic Russians 
 Ethnic Russians and other Slavic peoples fell into the category of migrants who 
left Central Asia and the Baltic countries after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. At the 
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time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, approximately 25 million ethnic Russians 
were culturally and ethnically displaced, living elsewhere in the former Soviet Union.
9
 
Due to a myriad of factors, ethnic Russians and other ethnic minorities, especially those 
who used Russian as a language of interethnic communication, such as Koreans, 
Germans and Jews, were more likely than members of the titular nationality to migrate.
10
 
Although the migration of ethnic Russians slowed by the mid-1990s, ethnic Russians still 
comprise a large portion of those migrating from Central Asia, especially those included 
in official statistics in migration inflows to Russia. This section of the paper will review 
migration statistics of ethnic Slavs and their motivation for migration decisions. 
 In Table 2 below there are data indicating the number of ethnic Russians and the 
percentage of ethnic Russian as a portion of the population in the Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as reported in the 1989 Soviet census. Russians comprised 
almost 38 percent of the population in Kazakhstan in 1989; 21.5 percent of Kyrgyzstan‟s 
population and 7.6 percent of Tajikistan in the last Soviet census. Ethnic Russians played 
an important role in political and economic life in these countries, especially in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Many of the ethnic Russians lived in metropolitan areas and 
did not speak the local languages.
11
 In Kazakhstan, ethnic Russians were employed in 
Soviet industries, such as the space or the defense industry.
12
 Many schools and institutes 
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of higher learning offered instruction solely in Russian in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan. However, due to perestroika in the 1980s, ethnic Russians‟ influence in 
political life in Central Asia had diminished. 
Table 2: Russians in Central Asia, 1989 
 Russians (#) Total Population 1989 Russians (%) 
Kazakhstan 6,267,337 16,536,511 37.9 
Kyrgyzstan 922,445 4,290,442 21.5 
Tajikistan 388,251 5,108,576 7.6 
Source: 1989 Soviet Union census (found online on the Universal Database of Russian 
Governmental Publications) 
 
 In Table 3 below, the number of ethnic Russians and the population of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania is presented, as reported in the 1989 Soviet census. Similar to in 
Kazakhstan, over 30 percent of Estonia‟s population was comprised of ethnic Russians. 
In Latvia, Russians made up 34 percent of the population. In Lithuania, 9.4 percent of the 
population was ethnic Russian. As in Central Asia, ethnic Russians were and remain 
concentrated in cities in the Baltic countries. Russians made up approximately half the 
population of Lithuania‟s capital Riga in 1989. 
Table 3: Russians in the Baltics, 1989 
 Russians (#) Total Population 1989 Russians (%) 
Estonia 476,593 1,572,916 30.3 
Latvia 911,210 2,680,029 34.0 
Lithuania 346,839 3,689,779 9.4 
Source: 1989 Soviet Union census (found online on the Universal Database of Russian 
Governmental Publications) 
 
Table 4: Emigration from the Main Slavic Groups from Central Asia, 1989-1995 
 Russians Ukrainians Belorussians Total 
Kazakhstan 614,000 82,000 16,000 712,000 
Kyrgyzstan 296,000 39,000 3,000 338,000 
Tajikistan 300,000 30,000 10,000 340,000 
Source: Landau, Politics of Language in the Ex-Soviet Muslim States, 42 
  
12 
 
 Already late in the Soviet years, there was a backlash in some Soviet Republics 
against the Russian-centric Soviet identity. The titular nationality groups made a push to 
strengthen the titular identity through improving support for the titular language and 
encouraging nationalism. These social and political changes marginalized ethnic Russians 
and others who did not belong to the titular nationality and even led to fear.
13
 In addition 
to ethnic marginalization, ethnic Russians were often disempowered and lost key political 
and economic leadership positions during the transition to independence.
14
 Specific 
policies and political changes will be addressed in the chapters on Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.  
 Another key factor in determining future migration is previous migration. Many 
of the ethnic Russians living outside Russia at the dissolution of the Soviet Union had 
migrated during Soviet times, therefore, this experience served as a proximate 
determinate of future migration. The newly-arrived had less of an attachment to their 
place of habitat and were likely to return to their titular homeland under the economic 
and political circumstances during the transition after the Soviet Union.
15
 Overall, the 
loss of social status and fear for future job stability, education opportunities for their 
children and economic and social marginalization caused ethnic Slavs and other groups to 
choose to migrate after independence. 
 As the ethnic Russians and other non-titular ethnic groups migrated from Central 
Asia, both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan attempted to stem the flow of outmigration to 
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prevent brain drain by altering language policy to be more favorable to Russian 
speakers.
16
 However, the outmigration of ethnic Russians constituted a significant portion 
of the migration from Central Asia to the Russian Federation. 
 In the table below, the number of Russians, the current population of the country 
and the percentage of ethnic Russians in Central Asia and the Baltic countries is listed. 
Between 1989 and 2009, Kazakhstan‟s population of ethnic Russians dropped from 37.9 
percent of the population to 23.7 percent. Kyrgyzstan‟s ethnic Russian population 
decreased from 21.5 percent to 12.5 percent of the population. In Tajikistan, the 
percentage of ethnic Russians of the population fell from 7.6 to 1.1 percent. In the Baltic 
countries, the number of ethnic Russians also diminished, although not to the extent as in 
Central Asia with the exception of Lithuania. In Estonia in 1989 ethnic Russians made up 
30.3 percent of the population and that fell to 25.6 percent in 2009. In 1989 Russians 
made up 34 percent of Latvia‟s population and in 2009 they made up 27.8 percent. 
Finally, Lithuania‟s 1989 population was comprised of 9.4 percent Russians whereas its 
2009 population is comprised only of 4.9 percent ethnic Russians. 
Table 5: Russians in Central Asia and the Baltics, 2009  
 Russians (#) Total Population Russians (%) % Change 
from 1989 
Kazakhstan 3,678,802 15,522,373 23.7 -40.9 
Kyrgyzstan 698,430 5,587,443 12.5 -23.8 
Tajikistan 82,362 7,487,489 1.1  -78.8 
Estonia 328,439 1,282,963 25.6 -31.1 
Latvia 612,909 2,204,708 27.8 -32.7 
Lithuania 173,242 3,535,547 4.9 -50.1 
Source: CIA World Factbook 
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2. Russia as a Migration Destination 
 Because the migration data used in this thesis is inflow data to the Russian 
Federation and migration flows within CIS are heavily directed toward Russia, the 
attractiveness of Russia as a migration destination is a factor worth examining. 
Government policy, the political environment and economic determinants are weighed 
and calculated in migration decisions. This section will assess Russian migration policy, 
the economic conditions in Russia and how destination factors unique to Russia affect 
migrants‟ decisions to migrate to Russia or to remain at home.  
 Migrants take both origin and destination factors into account when making a 
decision whether to migrate. In the period shortly after the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, some of the factors that influenced these decisions included familial linkages to 
migrants who had already migrated or family living elsewhere in the former Soviet 
Union, geographic proximity to appealing migration destinations and the ability to cross 
borders due to a lack of policy hindrances.
17
 Origin and destination factors are 
asymmetrical according to Wolfel‟s analysis of Central Asian migration.18 He claims that 
the push factors alone may not be considered sufficient to migrate; often the pull factors 
from the destination are sufficient to make the decision to migrate. Often information 
about destination factors is spread by word of mouth and contacts that have already 
migrated, so sometimes this information is outdated or false. Regardless of the validity of 
information, political and economic circumstances at the destination greatly influence a 
potential migrant‟s migration decision. 
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a. Economic Circumstances 
 The economic conditions in all of the former Soviet Union were dire following 
independence. There was a drastic drop in international trade with Central Asia in 
particular. From 1991 to 1993 there was a drop of 50 percent in trade to Kyrgyzstan.
19
 
The economic conditions caused a shortage of job opportunities in Central Asia that led 
people to seek employment opportunities in Russia. Economic restructuring and high 
inflation caused overall disorder. For example, real GDP declined by 48.9 percent 
between 1990 and 1995 in Kazakhstan.
20
 As indicated in Table 6 below, despite a 
negative GDP growth in Russia, its economic drop was comparatively less than 
elsewhere in Central Asia. By 1997, Russia‟s GDP began growing again; it already 
resumed growing in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1996, but the economic gains were 
slow. In these years, Russia would have been appealing because of its relative economic 
success compared to Central Asia. 
Table 6: Real GDP growth (annual percent change) 1993-1999 
GDP growth 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Kazakhstan -9.2 -12.6 -8.3 0.5 1.6 -1.9 2.7 
Kyrgyzstan -13 -19.8 -5.8 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 
Tajikistan -11.1 -21.4 -12.5 -4.4 1.7 5.3 3.7 
Russia -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.6 1.4 -5.3 6.4 
Source: The Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 
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Table 7: Real GDP growth 2000-2008 
GDP growth 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Kazakhstan 9.8 13.5 9.8 9.3 9.6 9.7 10.7 8.9 3.2 
Kyrgyzstan 5.4 5.3 0 7 7 -0.2 3.1 8.5 7.6 
Tajikistan 8.3 10.2 9.1 10.2 10.6 6.7 7 7.8 7.9 
Russia 10 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 8.5 5.2 
Source: The Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 
 
 The Russian economy in the early 1990s was characterized by privatization, the 
development of a market economy and chaos. In this transition, many people were 
rendered unemployed and plunged into poverty causing a spike in crime and corruption. 
Private property protection was and remains weak in Russia and private business is 
heavily regulated by the state. Although Russian GDP decreased in the early 1990s due to 
economic hardship and the loss of the former Soviet Republics, Russia‟s economy 
remained one of the largest in the world.
21
  
 Difficulties in implementation of fiscal reform and increased borrowing caused a 
financial crisis in 1998 in Russia. Hyperinflation and loss of international investment 
were some of the most serious consequences of this crisis. However, by the early 2000s, 
the Russian economy had stabilized, as a result of high global oil and gas prices. In the 
years of Putin‟s presidency, GDP per capita doubled and the Russian economy moved 
from being the 11
th
 largest to the sixth largest in the world.
22
  
In considering how the economic situation in Russia could influence migration 
from the Central Asia and Baltic regions to Russia, various quantitative economic 
measures can be contrasted between countries in those regions. Looking first at gross 
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domestic product (GDP) per capita (here in PPP terms
23
), Russia and the Baltics have 
followed similar upward trends since the mid- to late-1990s, although Estonia has risen to 
the highest level among the group, exceeding $18,500 PPP in 2010 while Russia stood at 
$15,800 PPP. The economic problems in Russian in the first half of the 1990s are also 
reflected by the actual annual decrease in GDP that occurred in those years. This 
information is presented in Figure 3. The data is shown for Central Asia in Figure 4, 
where extremely stark contrasts can be observed. Although lagging behind Russia in 
absolute terms, Kazakhstan has boosted per capita GDP to nearly $13,000 PPP. However, 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have languished at hugely lower GDP rates near the $2,000 
PPP mark. In terms of PPP, Russia is comparatively better than the Central Asian 
countries. Thus based on an economic explanation for migration Russia is an attractive 
migration destination because of relative comparative wealth, although not as attractive 
from Kazakhstan as from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. 
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Figure 3: GDP per capita in the Baltic countries, 1992-2010 
 
Note: No data available for Lithuania until 1998. 
 
Figure 4: GDP per capita in Central Asia, 1992-2010 
 
Although the trends in terms of wealth level are easier to see on plots of actual 
GDP per capita over time, economic performance can also be considered in terms of the 
GDP growth rate. This measure is more sensitive to particular annual influences; for 
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example in Figure 5, the Baltic countries and Russia showed large downturns in 2009 as a 
function of their connections to world trade and global economic hardships. The plot of 
GDP growth does show, however, that these countries have enjoyed positive and 
relatively high growth rates in almost every year for over a decade. Again, Russia‟s 
economic difficulties can be seen early on the graphed time period, where the Baltic 
countries got a head start on Russia in boosting their growth rates. Russia‟s growth 
lagged the Baltics until 1998 and shows a significant drop in growth in 1996 that affected 
Russia more than its Baltic neighbors. 
The comparison to Central Asia is shown in Figure 6. Despite low total GDP seen 
in previous graphs, this plot shows that since the late 1990s, these countries have 
experienced relatively stable growth rates. Kyrgyzstan has had the most volatile and 
lowest overall trend in the growth rate. Despite the fact that the GDP growth rates in 
Russia and Central Asia look comparable in percentage terms in this figure, the actual 
resulting increase in wealth in the poor Central Asian nations has been small because of 
the lower overall GDP in those countries. 
20 
 
Figure 5: Annual GDP Growth in the Baltics, 1992-2010 
 
 
Figure 6: Annual GDP Growth in Central Asia, 1992-2010 
 
A final economic measure for consideration is unemployment rates. The 
comparison between Russia and the Baltics is shown in Figure 7. Despite having richer 
economies, the Baltic countries also struggled to bring unemployment rates down to 
lower and more stable levels initially after independence. Since a major reversal in 1999, 
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Russia has generally maintained a downward trend in unemployment rates, which 
remained comparable to the Baltics until those countries experienced more severe spikes 
in 2009. Based on unemployment rates, Russia offers an advantage over the Baltic 
countries except for period two. 
The World Bank and CIA World Factbook surmise that official unemployment 
data from Central Asia is starkly underestimated,
24
 but the IMF compilation of official 
data is shown for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan alongside Russia in Figure 8.  The data 
indicate that these countries have had unemployment rates along similar lines to Russia 
since 2002.  The trend over the entire period for Kazakhstan more closely followed that 
of Russia, while the curve for Kyrgyzstan has been more flat. Since unemployment rates 
have been higher in Russia than in Kyrgyzstan based on this data, outmigration from 
these countries cannot be attributed to a lack of employment opportunities with the 
exception from Kazakhstan between the years 1994 and 2002. 
These economic indicators can be used to compare the conditions for migrants. 
Although Russia‟s unemployment rate was lower than the rate in some of the Baltic 
countries and lower than all of them from 1999 until 2005, migrants chose not to migrate 
to Russia. Additionally, although GDP growth was consistently stronger in Kazakhstan 
than in Russia, migration from Kazakhstan was higher than from the other Central Asian 
Republics where GDP per capita was significantly lower than in Russia and in 
Kazakhstan. This migration from Kazakhstan is not consistent with economically 
motivated migration. 
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Figure 7: Official Unemployment Rates in the Baltic Countries 
 
Figure 8: Official Unemployment Rates in Central Asia, 1992-2010 
 
b. Migration Policy 
 This section describes various migration policy changes in Russia since 1991. The 
decentralized nature of the enforcement of Russian migration policy leads to varying 
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levels of enforcement.
25
 Due to high levels of corruption, migration rules can often be 
disregarded or overlooked by local authorities if a bribe is paid. Because of corruption 
and varying levels of enforcement, migration policy in the Russian Federation appears to 
have a greater effect on the legality of migration, not the inflows to Russia.  
 Under Boris Yeltsin, the Russian administration did not devote noteworthy 
resources to the issue of the Russian Diaspora abroad and it did not try to make them a 
factor in Russian foreign policy. Moscow‟s goals for stability in Central Asia coincided 
with those of the regional leaders and thus did not try to support ethnic Russians in those 
countries. During the years Yeltsin was president, the administration was too distracted 
by other problems such as the conflict in Chechnya and the Caucasus, the civil war in 
Tajikistan and the fight for oil in the Caspian region to give migration policy much 
attention.
26
 
 The Russian government in the Yeltsin era occasionally asserted that protecting 
the Russian Diaspora abroad was a foreign policy goal, but actions rarely matched this 
rhetoric. Although Moscow tried to pressure the Central Asian governments to allow dual 
citizenship with Russia, Turkmenistan was the only country to do so. Amidst the political 
and cultural changes after independence, ethnic Russians felt vulnerable especially due to 
perceptions of employment and education discrimination as Central Asia and the Baltics 
began to promote the titular cultures and languages at the expense of Russian.
27
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 Ethnic Russians were faced with the decision whether to accept the newly 
independent states and show loyalty to these new states and to maybe vocalize their 
complaints about ethnic discrimination and lobby to preserve their status in society or to 
leave the country for environments perceived as more welcoming. The choice to pledge 
political loyalty to a Central Asian state meant renouncing Russian citizenship, except in 
the case of Turkmenistan which recognized dual citizenship until 2003, and learning the 
titular language (less than one percent of ethnic Russians living in Central Asia knew the 
titular languages).
28
 According to Charles Ziegler, many ethnic Russians were hesitant to 
accept the titular nationality as politically and culturally dominant after years of being 
carriers of the dominant language and culture in the Soviet Union.
29
 Because of the 
authoritarian nature of Central Asian regimes and the hostility to civil society 
development, Russians were not remarkably effective at politically organizing in the 
newly independent Central Asian states. In the 1990s, official Russian migration policy 
neither encouraged ethnic Russians to migrate to Russia nor offered them incentives to 
migrate back.
30
 
 In 1994 there was an attempt among the CIS members to regulate regional labor 
migration and protect migrants‟ rights. The Agreement on Cooperation in the Area of 
Labor Migration and Social Protection of Migrant Workers was signed in hopes of 
regulating migration procedures within the CIS. Underlying this agreement was the 
expectation that bilateral agreements on migrant quotas would be signed and appended as 
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needed. However, no such bilateral agreements were reached.
31
 In 1998 the CIS countries 
signed a second agreement that allowed information sharing between countries on labor 
migration, but it was never implemented due to a lack of databases and record keeping.
32
 
 By 1999, Russia withdrew from the 1992 Bishkek Agreement that had established 
a visa-free migration regime amongst the signing states. Between 1998 and 2000, CIS 
countries limited visa-free movement between countries with bilateral agreements and 
undertook measures for stricter border control. Russia‟s 1999 Law on Compatriots 
Abroad stated that “compatriots are people born in one state who are living or who have 
lived in it, and who possess general familiarity with the language, religion, cultural 
inheritance, traditions and customs, and also direct descendants of such people.”33 
However, migrants from CIS countries did not receive preference under this law.
34
 
Previously, citizens from CIS countries were permitted to seek employment opportunities 
while on a 90-day short term visa which could be renewed indefinitely by leaving the 
country and reentering, but under the new amendments, they were only permitted to visit 
Russia on this agreement. In 2002 Russia adopted the Law on the Legal Status of Foreign 
Citizens on the Territory of the Russian Federation which increased bureaucratic hurdles 
to receiving a work permit and legal registration for migrants and their employers. 
 In 2002 policymakers in Russia restricted the ability of migrants from other post-
Soviet countries to legally move to Russia and receive citizenship, which had been 
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significantly simpler in the early years after independence. Those migrants already 
residing in 2002 who had not yet received citizenship were also penalized and were often 
rendered stateless because they lost current legal rights to reside on the territory of the 
Russian Federation. Because of the bureaucratic hurdles that often require more than 90 
days to complete and the expense of receiving work permits and registration, many 
migrants are forced to become illegal even if they enter Russia legally.
35
 Although 
official records show that migration from Kazakhstan to Russia declined in the late 
1990s, many believe that migration rates have not changed, but became illegal in 
nature.
36
  The long shared border with Kazakhstan and difficulties in monitoring Russia‟s 
border helped sustain migration, although a discussion of legality of migration does not 
fall within the scope of this analysis.  
 Korobkov contends that the migrants entering Russia rarely stated their 
motivation for migration as ethnically motivated (such as due to language policy and 
social exclusion). In 1998, 13.6 percent of migrants said they migrated for ethnic 
consideration and only 5.2 percent in 2003.
37
 However, based on data from the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) Russia country profile in 2008, the 
migration from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan was comprised not primarily of individuals 
from the titular majority between 2002 and 2006
38
 (later data are not available) 
suggesting that migration was still ethnic in nature. Korobkov argues that by the fourth 
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period in 2005, migration rates increased due to liberalization of migration policy by the 
Putin administration to encourage migration,
39
 but while migration rates increase in the 
fourth period, they do not increase to the levels of period one or two suggesting that 
Russian Federation migration policy only moderately affects migration decisions.  
 Although migration policy was reportedly liberalized in 2005, migrants did not 
agree that procedures were simplified for them. In 2007 Il‟sada from Kyrgyzstan stated, 
“I don‟t have a work permit. And I don‟t know how and where to get one. But I have 
registration (sic). Nobody told me to get a work permit, but I filed my residency 
registration myself. An acquaintance helped me.”40 Other migrants reported that their 
employers would not help them acquire a work permit although this is a procedure that 
was supposed to be simplified in 2007 and employers can be fined up to 800,000 Russian 
rubles if caught employing migrants without a valid work permit.
41
 In 2007 Muzafar from 
Tajikistan reported that “I have a work permit and an alien registration card. The owner 
of the house helped me. I worked without a work permit for the first four years, (sic) 
though.”42 These statements support that migration procedures were not simplified and 
did not impact the decision to migrate. 
 The other half of the migration decision equation, after consideration of 
destination factors in Russia, is the economic and political factors in a potential migrant‟s 
country of origin, often referred to as push factors. The next chapters will discuss the 
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economic and political environments in the three Central Asian cases, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and for one case in the Baltics, Estonia. 
3. Kazakhstan 
a. Overview of Kazakhstan 
 This chapter presents an overview of the economic and political events in 
Kazakhstan and political measures in comparison with Russia that may have influenced 
migration decisions. Kazakhstan was the last Soviet Republic to declare independence on 
December 16, 1991. Overall, Kazakhstan is the most economically successful of the 
former Central Asian Republics. At the end of the Soviet Union, it also had the highest 
number of ethnic Russians. According to the CIA World Factbook, Kazakhstan‟s GDP 
was $182 billion and the real GDP growth rate was 1.2 percent in 2010. The GDP per 
capita was estimated to be $11,800 and in 2008 only 12.1 percent of Kazakhstan‟s 
population is believed to live below the poverty line. 
 The population of Kazakhstan in 2010 was estimated to be 15,522,373. According 
to the 1999 Kazakh census, the population is comprised of 53.4 percent Kazakhs, 30 
percent Russians, 3.7 percent Ukrainians, 2.5 percent Uzbeks, 2.4 percent Germans, 1.7 
percent Tatars, 1.4 percent Uyghurs and the remaining 4.9 percent are of other ethnicities. 
The most recent census in 2009 estimates that only 23.7 percent of Kazakhstan‟s 
population is made up of ethnic Russians, meaning that Kazakhstan has lost over six 
percent of its ethnic Russians since 1999. Kazakh is the state language of Kazakhstan 
although only 64.4 percent of the population speaks the language, according to the 1999 
census. A reported 95 percent of the population know Russian which is an official 
language, designated the “language of interethnic communication”.43  
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 President Nursultan Nazarbayev replaced ethnic Russian Gennady Kolbin in 1989 
to become the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Kazakhstan. He initially 
opposed independence from the Soviet Union because of fear of retribution from 
Kazakhstan‟s large Russian minority. Nazarbayev won the first presidential election and 
has remained Kazakhstan‟s president since 1991. In 1993 the constitution was amended 
so the prime minister and Council of Ministers reported to the president. In 1993 the 
Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan dissolved itself and Nazarybayev ruled by executive 
decree. In 1995 Nazarbayev was reelected in a presidential poll and later that year, the 
constitution was revised based on a fraudulent referendum.
44
 By the end of that year, no 
opposition parties were included in parliament anymore. A new constitution written in 
1995 reinforced this relationship and solidified executive power. Nazarbayev maintained 
ethnic harmony in Kazakhstan in contrast to neighboring countries and oversaw an 
economic transition which increased his popularity in the early years of his presidency.
45
 
 In late 1996, the language law was altered to give more rights to Russian speakers 
and stop the push for Kazakh language usage in public education. Despite this 
liberalization of the language law, immigration to Russia from Kazakhstan remained at a 
similar level from 1996-1999. The language law does not seem to have much impact on 
migration decisions. In March of 1997, the state oil ministry became Kazakh oil and 
Prime Minister Kazhegeldin warned that Kazakhstan was being ruled by oligarchs. He 
later mysteriously became ill and was replaced while out of the country.
46
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 In 2009, Kazakhstan removed term limits for the president, allowing Nazarbayev 
to remain president for life. His party, Nur Otan, retains complete control over 
parliament.
47
 In 2009 Nur Otan legislators called for a lifetime presidential term for 
Nazarbayev, but he refused (he can be reelected for seven-year terms without a term 
limitation). For a political party to be registered legally, it must have 50,000 members, an 
increase from 3,000 that was made law in 2002. To enter the parliament, a political party 
must receive seven percent of the vote. Because of these strict political party laws, Nur 
Otan currently has no opposition in parliament. Corruption is widespread within the 
government, security services, judicial system and in education. Cronyism is practiced for 
political appointments. The judicial branch does not function independently of the 
executive branch.
48
  
 Although the constitution guarantees freedom of the media, independent media 
faced intimidation, arrests and harassment. Websites critical of the regime are frequently 
shut down or blocked. Laws passed in 2005 limited religious freedom, including banning 
any religious activity by unregistered groups and giving the authorities freedom to 
oversee religious activities and ban “extremist” groups. In principle, private property 
rights exist, but wealth is largely concentrated in the hands of certain clans and relatives 
loyal to Nazarbayev.
49
 
 Kazakhstan faced economic hardships in the years following independence. In the 
early 1990s both the industrial and agricultural sectors, previously the largest employers 
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in the country, lost part of their share of the labor force. In 1992 workers in industry 
made up 31.2 percent of the labor force and by 1997 made up only 20.7 percent. 
Agriculture made up 32 percent of the labor force in 1990, but only 21 percent in 1996.
50
 
Prior to independence, the Kazakh economy depended on Soviet subsidies to maintain 
competitiveness. These grants and subsidies amounted to 13.6 percent of Kazakh GDP in 
1990 and the loss of these subsidies after independence substantially hurt independent 
Kazakhstan‟s economy. Kazakhstan had a large heavy industry sector that was largely no 
longer needed after independence.
51
 
 Kazakhstan‟s transition to a market economy was complicated by privatization 
efforts. Privatization of state assets was hindered by corruption and political infighting. 
However, Kazakhstan‟s new currency, the tenge, was introduced in 1994 and eventually 
helped to stabilize the economy, slow inflation and increase economic productivity, 
despite problems. 
b. Political Situation: Authoritarian Regime Measures 
 This section includes various measures by non-governmental organizations that 
quantify the political factors that could have affected migration decisions in Kazakhstan. 
Freedom House, an NGO that advocates for political freedom, human rights and 
democracy, has produced an annual report called Freedom in the World since 1972. This 
report measures the state of political and civil liberties on a scale of one to seven, one 
being the most free and seven being the least free. Based on these scores, countries are 
designated as “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” The rankings are compiled from 
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various sources and to help ensure the report‟s validity, its methodology is regularly 
evaluated by an independent group.
52
 
 In the latest Freedom in the World report on Kazakhstan in 2010, the country is 
considered “not free” due to a myriad of factors including corruption, cronyism within 
politics, lack of political variety, intimidation of journalists and obstacles to political 
party formation. Freedom House began ranking Kazakhstan in this report in 1992 and the 
country has been considered “unfree” since 1994. The graphs below highlight 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Estonia‟s scores in the various Freedom House measurements. 
Estonia is used as a comparison country to indicate the best case political scenario in the 
states of the former Soviet Union. Section 6 of this paper considers the political and 
economic situation in Estonia. 
 Freedom House political rights score for Kazakhstan, shown in Figure 9, has 
remained consistently poor over time. The political rights score takes political party 
development, independence of the branches of government, military influence on politics, 
ability of political opposition to function and environment for political discussions and 
gatherings.
53
 This score can be contrasted with the score for Estonia which has remained 
excellent since shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia, also shown on the same 
figure, has become progressively politically less free over the same time period beginning 
around 1996. Russia had greater political rights than Kazakhstan in periods one and two; 
was slightly better in period three and equally bad in period four, thus minimizing 
political incentive to migrate from Kazakhstan to Russia by 2004. The greatest gap 
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between the two countries was in period two when Kazakh outmigration rates remained 
high indicating a political spur for migration. 
 Figure 9: Political Rights score (Kazakhstan) 
 
 In Freedom House civil liberties measurements over the same period, shown in 
Figure 10 below, Estonia and Russia have diverged from parity in 1991 to follow 
different paths. The civil liberties measure a country‟s rule of law, freedom of economic 
activity and freedoms of expression, religion and assembly.
54
 Estonia improved by two 
points in the measure while Russia‟s score became worse by two points. Kazakhstan and 
Russia have equally low scores by this measure, indicating an absence of civil liberties, 
although Russia‟s diminishing liberties makes Russia a less attractive destination for 
potential migrants later in the period whereas Kazakhstan offers stability in this regard. 
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Figure 10: Civil Liberties score (Kazakhstan) 
 
 Freedom House also annually measures freedom of the press in the world. This 
survey assesses media independence in 186 countries and evaluates freedom in print 
media, broadcasts and the internet. Each country is given a numerical score and a ranking 
in a category of “free”, “partly free” or “not free”.55 Estonia, Kazakhstan and Russia‟s 
scores for freedom of the press have been depicted in Figure 11 from 1994 to 2008. 
Estonia has gradually improved scores which were already comparable to other European 
democracies, while Russia, which in 1994 had a much freer press than Kazakhstan, has 
taken an opposite trajectory to Estonia. In 2008, Russian press freedom reached parity 
with the Kazakh press freedom. Previously, Kazakhstan had the least free press of these 
three countries and over time, it has gradually become less free. Freedom House cites 
                                                 
55
 “Freedom of the Press,” http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=16. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Fr
e
e
d
o
m
 H
o
u
se
 C
iv
il 
Li
b
e
rt
ie
s 
Sc
o
re
 (
lo
w
e
r 
is
 m
o
re
 
fr
e
e
) Estonia
Kazakhstan
Russia
36 
 
concerns for journalists‟ safety and self-censorship in Russia and Kazakhstan, as well as 
the government‟s control over the media environment. 
Figure 11: Freedom of the Press (Kazakhstan) 
 
 In another political measure, Transparency International calculates the perceived 
corruption in the public sector in 178 countries worldwide in its annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index. Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain”.56 The index is calculated based on the results of 13 
survey results on questions about political and administrative corruption in the public 
sector. The results from 1997 until 2010 for Kazakhstan, Russia and Estonia are pictured 
in Figure 12 below. With only small fluctuations over time, Russia and Kazakhstan have 
remained almost equal with high perceived public sector corruption, in contrast to 
Estonia with low perceived corruption.  
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 The perceived public sector corruption, along with these various political 
measures, indicate that the political situation in Russia offered some respite for those 
migrants leaving Kazakhstan in the 1990s, when the press in Russia was considerably 
freer than that in Kazakhstan and overall, citizens had greater political rights. However, 
this situation worsened in the late 1990s and similar dismal political and civil liberties 
have converged in Kazakhstan and Russia. 
Figure 12: Corruption Perceptions Index (Kazakhstan) 
 
c. Language Policy and Ethnic Conflict 
 All five Central Asian Republics enacted some variant on language law declaring 
the local language to be the official language in 1989, a political policy that affected 
Russian speakers. Russian, however, remains widely used, especially in Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan. Bhavna Davé argues that the law in Kazakhstan was only decreed to silence 
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nationalists who wanted to demote the status of Russian.
57
 Because the government was 
too fearful of upsetting both ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking Kazakhs, the law was 
created, but not strongly enforced. In practice Russian is still used in the public sphere, in 
business and in politics, especially in urban areas. 
 During the forced resettlement and urbanization of Kazakhstan in the 1920s and 
1930s, almost 40 percent of the indigenous population perished. By 1954 under the rule 
of Nikita Khrushchev, millions of European Russians flowed into Kazakhstan and by 
1959, 60 percent of the population was Slavic, Russian speakers.
58
 Kazakhstan was the 
only Central Asian country to ever have a Slavic majority, so this legacy combined with 
geographic proximity to Russia, the development of education institutions in Russian and 
other factors has kept the usage of Russian high since Kazakhstan‟s independence 
compared to the other Central Asian Republics implying a more welcoming environment 
for Russian speakers. 
 In 1989, 64 percent of ethnic Kazakhs were fluent in Russian, while less than one 
percent of ethnic Russians living in Kazakhstan were fluent in Kazakh. In comparison, in 
Kyrgyzstan in 1989, 37 percent of the population was fluent in Russian and 22 percent of 
Uzbekistan‟s population was fluent in Russian.59 Davé contends the better the population 
spoke Russian, the worse they spoke the native language, a problem that was especially 
pronounced in Kazakhstan.
60
 In 1989, it was estimated that 28 to 40 percent of Kazakhs 
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did not have command of the Kazakh language and almost 75 percent of Kazakhs did not 
use Kazakh as their language of daily interaction, but rather used Russian.
61
 These 
numbers point to a greater need to educate the population in the local language in 
Kazakhstan than in other Central Asian states, where most of the population had 
command of the local language. This widespread usage of the Russian language also 
supports the idea that fewer ethnic Russians fled Kazakhstan because of animosity 
towards the Russian language, such as in the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
where language laws were strongly implemented against the use of Russian.  
 Although Kazakhstan declared Kazakh the only official language in 1989 and 
denied Russian status as an official language again in 1997‟s “Law of Languages,” the 
political push for Kazakh language use is perceived by some Kazakh nationalists as 
symbolic and a political tool rather than something actively pursued by the citizenry of 
Kazakhstan.
62
 Daily language use in Kazakhstan on the whole remains unchanged. 
Politicians chose to promote Kazakh as a form of affirmative action, because Russian did 
not need any support; there is no punishment for use of Russian. Davé contends 
Kazakhstan‟s President Nursultan Nazarbayev keeps a moderate policy on language to 
help maintain ethnic relations.
63
 There is little public debate in Kazakhstan on language 
laws and there is a noticeable gap between the laws and their implementation.  
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 Davé asserts Russian is still dominant because of Russian-speaking Kazakhs who 
do not sufficiently command Kazakh and not because of ethnic Russians.
64
 There are 
neither Kazakh proficiency tests for government jobs or higher education, nor is 
responsibility to teach Kazakh on the state, but rather on the citizen. Citizens self-report 
on their language ability and thus, it is believed fewer Kazakhs have Kazakh proficiency 
than is actually reported.
65
 Because of this reported self-compliance to the language law, 
the Kazakh government has no need to implement stricter policy or enforce the law. 
 In Kazakhstan, Kazakh is not needed to succeed in politics or business. In fact, 
Davé contends that the need for English skills is actually greater than Kazakh.
66
 The Law 
on Languages silenced the debate on language policy because Kazakh nationalists were 
placated by the adoption of the law and Russian speakers were not threatened by it 
because full implementation was too costly initially and the political will to enforce it 
does not exist currently.
67
 Moreover, the law appears democratic and liberal in promoting 
Kazakh language and identity on the part of the current government, but allows 
avoidance of debate on the topic. As an attempt to stem the outmigration of ethnic 
Russians, the Constitutional Court confirmed the equality of the Russian and Kazakh 
languages in 2007. However, in January of 2009, Kazakhstan decided to continue the 
practice of registering ethnicity in citizens‟ passports and some ethnic Russians complain 
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of discriminatory practices in job hiring and education, indicating that ethnic Russians 
felt affected by changes in language policy, regardless of implementation.
68
 
 In comparison to its Central Asian neighbors, Kazakhstan is relatively free of 
ethnic conflict. However, Kazakhstan is still considered authoritarian in politics, political 
party creation and freedom of the media by international watchdogs. For instance, the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) concluded that the Kazakh 
presidential election in 2005 did not meet international democratic standards. 
 The trends in migration in Kazakhstan follow a similar pattern to the other Central 
Asian Republics in that in the first seven to eight years following independence 
migrations rates to the Russian Federation were high, especially among non-ethnic 
Kazakhs (see the changes in ethnic composition of Kazakhstan in section 1b). Although 
the political reasons for migration were not as pronounced as in Tajikistan or Kyrgyzstan 
(which will be reviewed in the next two chapters), most people migrated primarily for 
political and ethnic reasons, which led to large outflows of ethnic Russians and other 
Slavic groups.  
 The major economic and political developments in Kazakhstan are listed in Table 
8 below by period. Kazakhstan was economically better off than its neighbors Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, but still sent a higher rate of migrants to Russia in period two. This 
higher rate of migration supports politically-motivated migration since Russia still 
offered a political advantage during that period. 
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Table 8: Migration, Political and Economic Developments in Kazakhstan 
 Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Migration 
Trends 
15.31 
 
13.51 4.15 2.66 
Political 
Trends 
- Decreasing 
political rights 
score/fluctuating 
civil rights score 
- Decreasing press 
freedom 
-1993/95: power 
concentrated in 
executive branch 
- Stable political 
rights score 
- Decreasing press 
freedom 
- Russian 
language given 
almost equal 
rights to Kazakh 
- Stable political 
rights score 
- Russia meets 
Kazakhstan‟s low 
PR score 
- Decreasing press 
freedom 
- Corruption scores 
decrease 
- Stable political 
rights score 
- Decreasing 
press freedom 
- Russia‟s press 
freedom matches 
Kazakh. in 2007 
- Corruption 
scores increase 
Economic 
Trends 
- Negative economic 
growth 
- Industry/agri-
cultural sectors lose 
share of labor force 
- 1997: oil 
ministry privatized 
- Positive 
economic growth 
resumes 
- Unemployment 
rates consistently 
decreasing 
- GDP growth 
peaks in 2000 
- GDP growth 
slows from 
previous period 
 - GDP per capita 
increases 
4. Kyrgyzstan 
a.  Overview of Kyrgyzstan 
 This chapter summarizes the economic and political events in Kyrgyzstan since 
independence as well as gives political measures for the country in comparison with 
Russia. Kyrgyzstan, or officially the Kyrgyz Republic, declared independence on August 
31, 1991 and became fully independent on December 25, 1991. Kyrgyzstan is 
characterized by political problems similar to other Central Asian countries, such as an 
unfree press, undemocratic elections and hindrances to political party development, but it 
has also suffered from ethnic conflict between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks and riots and 
uprisings that have unseated Presidents Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek Bakiyev in 2005 
and 2010 respectively. 
 As estimated by the CIA World Factbook, the 2010 population of Kyrgyzstan was 
5,587,443. According to the 1999 Kyrgyz census, the population was comprised of 63.9 
percent ethnic Kyrgyz, 13.8 percent ethnic Uzbek, 12.5 percent ethnic Russian, 1 percent 
Dungans, Ukrainians and Uyghurs and 5.7 percent of other ethnicities. Kyrgyzstan is the 
second poorest of the Central Asian Republics, followed only by Tajikistan. The 2009 
estimated GDP of Kyrgyzstan was $12.09 billion with a 2.3 percent real growth rate in 
that year. The GDP per capita (PPP) in 2009 was estimated to be $2,200. An estimated 40 
percent of Kyrgyzstan‟s population lives below the poverty line. 
 Askar Akayev became president of Kyrgyzstan following independence in 1991. 
He remained in the post until March 2005 when protestors ousted him from office while 
protesting flawed parliamentary elections. In his years as president, Akayev consolidated 
power in the office of the president and elections in those years were criticized by 
44 
 
international observers as not meeting democratic standards.
69
 Akayev marginalized 
potential political opponents. In the late 1990s, although Kyrgyzstan‟s economy had 
begun growing again, economic growth was a result of gold mining and agriculture and 
overall economic growth was slower than expected by the World Bank. Inflation rates 
increased in 1997-1999 because of the devaluation of the Kyrgyz currency (som) in 
relation to the Russian ruble and economic shocks from Russia‟s crisis reverberated in 
Kyrgyzstan such as an increased trade deficit due to higher than usual imports and slow 
export growth.
70
  
 Although Akayev‟s reelection in December 2000 caused fear of ethnic conflict 
between ethnic Uzbek and Kyrgyz after militants from Uzbekistan entered Kyrgyzstan 
earlier in the year, no immediate conflict ensued. Following the election, there was a 
period of moderate GDP growth. An account deficit improved moderately since 1998. 
GDP growth slowed in the early 2000s to approximately four percent annual growth. In 
those years, inflation slowed dramatically. Akayev supported the global war on terrorism 
and permitted the American government access to airports on Kyrgyz territory beginning 
in 2001.
71
 In 2000-2001, certain sectors of Kyrgyzstan‟s economy improved, such as 
agriculture and gold, but overall, the industrial sector was plagued by a recession. 
 Following Akayev‟s ouster, Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected president in July of 
2005 after making a deal with his main opponent Feliks Kulov, who later came to oppose 
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Bakiyev‟s presidency. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe reported 
that this election was an improvement from previous elections in Kyrgyzstan.
72
 
 Bakiyev‟s security forces violently dispersed 2007 protests against the regime. In 
the following years, Bakiyev‟s party pushed through changes in parliament to concentrate 
and broaden his political power. Several opponents of Bakiyev were mysteriously killed. 
Corruption was and remains widespread in Kyrgyzstan and cronyism was practiced 
among the political elites. Bakiyev was reelected in July 2009 in what were deemed 
undemocratic elections by the OSCE. The following March, Bakiyev fled Kyrgyzstan 
amidst widespread protests. In June 2010 Kyrgyzstan adopted a new constitution that 
allowed for free, multiparty parliamentary elections under interim President Roza 
Otunbayeva. This constitution also aimed to balance power between the branches of 
government and to rid Kyrgyzstan of the all-powerful executive branch. Freedom House 
criticized the business environment in Kyrgyzstan describing corruption, personal 
connections, and widespread poverty as hindrances to equality of opportunity. Although 
Kyrgyz citizens can freely migrate internationally, a strict registration system remains in 
place hindering internal migration opportunities.
73
 
b. Political Situation: Authoritarian Regime Measures 
 The following section reviews political factors in Kyrgyzstan. In Figure 13 below, 
the political liberties scores for Kyrgyzstan and Russia are contrasted with Estonia‟s 
scores. In 1991, Russia‟s scores were two points higher than Kyrgyzstan‟s scores and 
were better in periods one and two. Kyrgyzstan‟s score improved somewhat in period 
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four and held steady until 2010 when it improved slightly. Kyrgyzstan‟s scores remained 
generally worse than Russia‟s until 2004 when Russia‟s ranking worsened indicating a 
political motivation to migrate to Russia from Kyrgyzstan until 2005. 
Figure 13: Political Rights score (Kyrgyzstan) 
 
 Similarly, civil liberties scores for Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Estonia were relatively 
similar in 1991 (Figure 14 below). In contrast, Russia‟s score consistently declined until 
1999 and then stabilized. Kyrgyzstan‟s score fluctuated over time mirroring political 
events in the country. However, in the most recent assessment Kyrgyzstan‟s score 
improved and the country was re-categorized as “partly free” after the adoption of a new 
constitution in 2010. However, Russia maintained an advantage over Kyrgyzstan in this 
regard until period four. 
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Figure 14: Civil Liberties score (Kyrgyzstan) 
 
 According to Freedom House‟s Freedom of the Media assessment, the media 
situation in Russia and Kyrgyzstan has worsened over time, shown in Figure 15 below. In 
Kyrgyzstan, the situation has had greater fluctuations with periods of improvement such 
as in 2005 when Bakiyev became president, whereas Russia‟s score only had a period of 
improvement from 1996 to 1998. Russia‟s media climate was initially freer than 
Kyrgyzstan, but has fallen from a score of 40 to 78 between 1992 and 2008 (the latest 
available assessment). Kyrgyzstan‟s score has fallen from 49 to 70. Journalists in 
Kyrgyzstan, such as independent newspaper editor Cholpon Orozobekova in 2008, have 
been forced to migrate and seek asylum outside of Kyrgyzstan because of the restrictions 
on the media. She was the ninth Kyrgyz journalist or human rights activist to flee 
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Kyrgyzstan in 2007 and 2008 because of threats, violence and dubious criminal 
charges.
74
     
Figure 15: Freedom of the Press (Kyrgyzstan) 
 
 Kyrgyzstan is one of the top twenty countries in the world with the highest 
perceived corruption in the public sector as measured annually with surveys by Berlin-
based non-governmental organization Transparency International. The data from 1996 
until 2010 (Kyrgyzstan was only included in the survey beginning in 2004) is shown in 
Figure 16 below. Kyrgyzstan and Russia‟s levels of perceived corruption have somewhat 
increased and they are consistently ranked as countries with high perceived levels of 
corruption. The situation in Kyrgyzstan is broadly similar to in Kazakhstan.  
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Figure 16: Corruption Perceptions Index (Kyrgyzstan) 
 
c. Language Policy and Ethnic Conflict 
 Prior to 1989, only one of 73 schools in Bishkek used Kyrgyz as the primary 
language of instruction. Since then, the number of Russian schools has decreased by 39.3 
percent, especially in the southern part of Kyrgyzstan and Kyrgyz is a compulsory subject 
in all schools.
75
 The Language Law of 1989 declared Kyrgyz the official language of 
Kyrgyzstan, and although the number of Russian schools has decreased, Russian and 
Uzbek-language schools continue to function. In the south of Kyrgyzstan, the population 
is up to 25 percent Uzbek and therefore, some schools in that region use Uzbek as the 
primary language. Similarly, the ethnic Russian population remains concentrated in the 
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cities, especially Bishkek, and schools are allowed to choose their language of 
instruction, hence the remaining Russian schools.
76
 
 By 2000, due to fears of complete outmigration of ethnic Russians and other 
Slavic groups and because the elite spoke Russian, Kyrgyzstan gave the Russian 
language the status of an official language again. Kyrgyz politicians realized they needed 
to maintain Russian to stay on friendly terms with Moscow, to communicate with their 
neighbors and to socially include Russians in Kyrgyz society.
77
 However, they did not 
give the Uzbek language a similar bump in status, despite a large Uzbek minority in the 
southern regions of Kyrgyzstan. 
 Multiethnic Kyrgyzstan has been plagued with political and ethnic conflict. 
During the riots of 1990, 120 Uzbeks and 50 Kyrgyz were killed and Mikhail Gorbachev 
was compelled to call in the Red Army to intervene and enforce peace.
78
 Ethnic conflict 
between ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks seems to simmer below the surface constantly in 
southern Kyrgyzstan threatening to erupt as it did in 1990 and again in 2010.  
 The 2005 Tulip Revolution overthrew President Askar Akayev and Kurmanbek 
Bakiyev became president in July of 2005. Major opposition protests against Bakiyev 
began and lasted throughout 2006. A new constitution signed in November of 2006 
attempted to balance power better between the executive and legislative branches. 
However, by the end of 2006, the parliament added amendments to the new constitution 
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that allowed the president to retain broader executive power, thus rendering the new 
constitution moot.
79
  
 Bakiyev was overthrown in political rioting in 2010 and replaced with interim 
president Roza Otunbayeva, a former foreign minister. After the April 2010 revolution, 
ethnic conflict broke out in southern Kyrgyzstan between ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic 
Uzbeks. Although not included in the scope of this paper, the political uncertainty likely 
led to higher migration rates during this time. 
 Shortly after independence, Kyrgyzstan displayed many similarities to 
Kazakhstan in migration patterns due to their large populations of Europeans.
80
 The 
noteworthy political and economic changes in Kyrgyzstan are listed by migration period 
in Table 9 below. The higher migration rate in period four and the worsening economic 
situation combined with an unstable political situation under Bakiyev suggest that this 
migration could be politically or economically motivated. However, in the initial period, 
Russia offered an attractive political alternative suggesting that some of this migration 
was motivated by political and ethnic factors at the origin and destination. Similar to 
Kazakhstan, the 2008 IOM report on Russia gives information on the ethnic composition 
of migration and the majority of migrants from Kyrgyzstan from 2002-2006 were not 
ethnic Kyrgyz, supporting that this migration was political. 
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Table 9: Migration, Political and Economic Developments in Kyrgyzstan 
 Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Migration 
Trends 
14.12 3.10 2.25 3.92 
Political 
Trends 
- Political rights 
score fluctuates 
- Civil liberties 
scores decrease 
- Freedom of the 
press worsens 
- Russia politically 
better 
- Political rights 
scores decrease 
1998-2000 
- Civil liberties 
scores decrease 
through 1998 
- Russia retains 
political advantage 
- Political rights 
scores stabilize 
- Civil liberties 
scores stabilize 
- Improves 
compared to 
Russia 
 
- Akayev 
overthrown in 
Tulip Revolution 
- Bakiyev elected 
- Political rights 
scores fluctuate 
- Better than 
Russia politically 
Economic 
Trends 
- GDP growth 
negative 
- Worse off than 
Russia and 
Kazakhstan 
- GDP growth 
resumes 
- Unemployment 
rates increase 
- High inflation 
- GDP growth 
fluctuates 
- GDP per capita 
increases slightly 
- GDP increases 
and then 
decreases 
- GDP still lower 
than in Russia 
5. Tajikistan 
a. Overview of Tajikistan 
 The next chapter presents a summary of the economic and political events in 
Tajikistan that may have influenced migration, as well as presenting political measures 
for comparison with Russia. Tajikistan declared independence from the Soviet Union on 
September 9, 1991, and became an independent country on December 26, 1991. In 
comparison with the other countries of the former Soviet Union, Tajikistan is the largest 
labor exporter as a percentage of its population. Tajikistan, after suddenly becoming 
independent in 1991 like the other former countries of the Soviet Union, was barely able 
to create a Tajik state. Then the country erupted into a violent civil war between the 
United Tajik Opposition and the government and its supporters that lasted until 1997. The 
fighting took place in the southern part of the country and in Dushanbe. During this 
period, consumer prices jumped, but later stabilized due to the assistance of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). GDP levels in 1996 were almost half of their 1989 
rates. Unemployment, like elsewhere in Central Asia, plagued Tajikistan.
81
 It is estimated 
that 50,000 to 100,000 people died during the civil war and over a million others were 
displaced either internally in Tajikistan or as refugees in neighboring countries. By 1997, 
Tajikistan‟s economy and infrastructure were in shambles. 
 Tajikistan remains the poorest of the Central Asian Republics. Its estimated GDP 
in 2009 was $13.65 billion and the GDP real growth rate was 3.4 percent. In that year, 
GDP per capita (PPP) was estimated to be $1,900. According to the CIA World 
Factbook, approximately 53 percent of Tajikistan‟s population lives under the poverty 
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line. The 2010 estimated population of Tajikistan is 7,487,489. According to the 2000 
Tajikistan census, the population is comprised of 79.9 percent Tajiks, 15.3 percent 
Uzbeks, 1.1 percent Russians, 1.1 percent Kyrgyz and the remaining 2.6 percent are of 
other ethnicities. Tajik is the official language of the country, but Russian is widely used 
in government, business and higher education. 
 Emomali Rahmonov (who de-Russified his surname “Rahmon” in 2007) was 
elected president of Tajikistan in 1994 at the end of the violent period of the devastating 
civil war, when Tajikistan was in ruins. Rahmon negotiated a ceasefire between 
opposition groups in 1997. He was reelected in 1999, although the elections were 
criticized by international observers. Rahmon‟s political party, the People‟s Democratic 
Party of Tajikistan, holds a majority in the parliament.  
 After a 2003 constitutional referendum, Rahmon was permitted to stay in the post 
of president until 2020. He was reelected again in 2006. These elections were considered 
non-democratic by Western observers. The winter of 2007/2008 was characterized by 
food and electricity shortages so severe that the UN eventually stepped in to assist. In 
2007 Tajikistan was also plagued by high inflation. For example, in that year the cost of 
wheat increased by 70 percent.
82
 
 Economic performance and fiscal reform in 1998-2000 was weak due to low tax 
revenue and high inflation rates. In these years, low global commodity prices caused an 
increase in Tajikistan‟s trade deficit.83 From 2000-2003 the regime silenced dissent and 
the economy‟s growth slowed due to industrial restructuring and land reform. By 2003, 
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inflation was down to 14 percent. Unemployment rose after early 2001 and reached an 
estimated 25 percent of the labor force by the end of 2001.  
 Opponents of the president are often harassed or imprisoned. Family members of 
Rahmon are greatly influential in business in Tajikistan, a result of the power of 
patronage networks in the country.
84
 Despite a guarantee of freedom of the press, 
independent media outlets are limited and criticism of the government is rarely published. 
Corruption is pervasive in the government, security services and in education. Certain 
websites critical of the regime are blocked. The regime is known to ban or block public 
gatherings or protest.
85
 Although some opposition groups are allowed to operate in 
Tajikistan, they face harassment and receive little media coverage as most of Tajikistan‟s 
media is controlled by the state. In the name of fighting terrorism, Rahmon has restricted 
rights of religious groups and banned those deemed extremist.
86
 
b. Political Situation: Authoritarian Regime Measures 
 The next section reviews political trends in Tajikistan since independence. 
According to Freedom House assessments on Freedom in the World, Tajikistan is 
categorized as “unfree”. Shown in Figure 17 below, political rights in Tajikistan were 
ranked considerably lower than in Russia and Estonia. Russia‟s score in political liberties 
has consistently worsened. The situation for civil liberties in Tajikistan, shown below in 
Figure 18, has followed a similar trajectory. In scores for political and civil liberties in 
periods one and two, Tajikistan was assessed as significantly worse than Russia, but since 
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2002 for political liberties and 2004 for civil liberties, Russia no longer offers a political 
advantage for migrants. The political gap between Russia and Tajikistan in period two 
was the greatest of all the Central Asian countries. Although the general migration rate 
does not reflect this, the migration rate with the ethnic Russian population as a base is the 
highest of all the countries in period two (see Table 13: Migration rates based on ethnic 
Russian population, 1989 in the conclusion) indicating politically motivated migration. 
Figure 17: Political Rights score (Tajikistan) 
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Figure 18: Civil Liberties score (Tajikistan) 
 
 
Figure 19: Freedom of the Press (Tajikistan) 
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Figure 19 above, was stable was 1994 through 2000, worsened and then improved 
slightly since 2004. Russia‟s climate for the media, on the other hand, has consistently 
worsened and reached parity with Tajikistan in 2008. Both countries were ranked 
“unfree”. Freedom House cited concerns over Tajikistan‟s media in that criticism of the 
president is considered a criminal offense punishable with a jail term of five years and 
there is little journalism independent of the government.
87
 
 In the Corruption Perceptions Index by Transparency International, in Figure 20 
below, Tajikistan‟s perceived corruption improved slightly to reach parity with Russian 
perceived corruption in 2010. Since Tajikistan was included in the report in 2004, its 
perceived corruption was somewhat worse than Russia‟s. 
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Figure 20: Corruption Perceptions Index (Tajikistan) 
 
c. Language Policy and Ethnic Conflict 
 In the late 1980s there was a Tajik nationalist movement that pressured the 
government for greater support for Tajik language and culture. The language law that was 
passed in July of 1989 declared Tajik the official state language and passage of this law 
encouraged the nationalist movement. Government and private efforts promoted the Tajik 
language. In 1994 President Rahmon tried to balance his government‟s interest in 
placating nationalists and the Russian government, which maintained a military presence 
and helped Tajikistan guard its border, by declaring that Russian would remain in schools 
as the language of communication. Of all five Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan has the 
lowest number of ethnic Russians remaining as a proportion of the population at only 1.1 
percent (see Table 5) and the largest percentage decline of the Russian population since 
1989. However, the Russian language remains vital for economic opportunities and 
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access to education, especially higher education. The majority of ethnic Russians living 
in Tajikistan at the dissolution of the Soviet Union fled the country during the ethnic 
clashes of the Tajik civil war that lasted between 1992 and 1997.  
 With the inability to act politically and economically, language policy was not a 
top priority in Tajikistan. In 1996 and 1997 checks revealed that only five to ten percent 
of government offices were using Tajik as prescribed by the language law. Although the 
year 2000 had been set as a deadline to transfer all government work into Tajik, this 
deadline was postponed due to financial restrictions and a lack of necessary technology in 
Tajik.
88
  
 There is also a risk that insurgent activity in Afghanistan, or the ethnic unrest in 
the Kyrgyz Republic in June 2010, could spread to Tajikistan. Tajikistan is less ethnically 
mixed than the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, but has a sizeable ethnic Uzbek 
minority. Although outright inter-ethnic conflict in the Kyrgyz Republic has receded, the 
situation remains unstable and this instability affects migration rates.
89
 
 The noteworthy economic and political events in Tajikistan are listed by period in 
Table 10 below. Tajikistan‟s political situation in the early 1990s was comparatively 
worse than elsewhere in the former Soviet Union. Although this is not indicated in 
normal migration rates, when migration rates are calculated using the ethnic Russian 
population as a base (see Table 13), Tajikistan‟s migration rates are the highest lending 
credence to the argument that this migration is not economically motivated, but rather 
driven by the political situation in Tajikistan. 
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Table 10: Migration, Political and Economic Developments in Tajikistan 
 Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Migration 
Trends 
10.42 4.23 1.04 2.23 
Political 
Trends 
- Violent period 
of the civil war 
- Worsening 
political and 
civil liberties, 
then stabilized 
- Relative stable 
press freedom, 
but worse than 
Russia 
 
- Civil war officially 
ends in 1997 
- Political rights 
improved from 96-97 
- Worsening civil 
liberties, then 
stabilization 
- Rahmon reelected 
1999 
- Russia still offers 
political advantage 
- Stable political 
liberties 
- Worsening 
civil liberties 
through 2002, 
then stable 
- Press freedom 
worsens, as do 
civil/political 
liberties in 
Russia 
 
- Stable political 
and civil liberties 
- Press freedom 
slightly improves 
- Corruption 
perceptions stable 
across entire period 
- 2005 Russian 
border troops leave 
- Russia offers no 
political advantage 
Economic 
Trends 
- GDP growth 
negative (worst 
year was 1994) 
- Worst off of all 
Central Asian 
successor states 
- GDP rates in 1996 
half of 1989 levels 
- High inflation/ low 
tax revenue 
- Russia/Kazakhstan 
economically 
stronger 
- Economic 
growth slows 
- Rising 
unemployment 
rates 
- Improvement, 
but still GDP 
growth/GDP per 
capita lower 
- Economic growth 
until global 
economic crisis 
starts in 2008 
- Stronger growth 
than Russia but 
comparatively 
worse 
 
6. Estonia 
a. Overview of Estonia 
 This chapter gives an overview of the economic and political events in Estonia 
since independence. Estonia became independent from the Soviet Union on August 20, 
1991, four months earlier than the Central Asian Republics. Estonia is being used as the 
Baltic comparison country because of its relative economic success and its sizeable 
Russian minority population. This section will review the economic and political 
developments in Estonia since gaining independence from the Soviet Union and discuss 
its Russian minority and citizenship laws. A constitution was adopted in Estonia in 1992 
and parliamentary elections were held later that year. By 1994, Russia had completely 
withdrawn its military presence from Estonia. 
 In 1992 Estonia replaced the ruble with the kroon (EEK) that was pegged to the 
Deutsche Mark and later to the Euro. During the transition to a market economy, Estonia 
battled inflation and a banking crisis. Estonia‟s constitution mandates a balanced budget 
and therefore, the country has very little public debt.
90
 By the mid to late 1990s, Estonia‟s 
inflation rates were falling as GDP growth remained stable. Because of Estonia‟s 
European Union (EU) entry discussions, Estonia received comparatively higher foreign 
investment than its neighbors in 1997.
91
 Although Estonia had a growing trade deficit in 
the mid 1990s, it was offset by foreign investment and a booming tourism industry and 
increased privatization of planned companies encouraged further investment.
92
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 By the mid-to-late 1990s, EU negotiations pushed Estonia to strive for fiscal 
reform and to synchronize legislation to meet EU norms. Estonia‟s government displayed 
a willingness to intervene if the economy seemed to grow at an unstable pace. By 1996 
the construction sector, one that had been the hardest hit in the restructuring of the 
economy post-independence, rose over 35 percent in the first half of 1997. Although 
inflation rates and consumer prices were expected to be higher than its Baltic neighbors 
in 1997, Estonia‟s consumer prices increased less than projected and its inflation rates 
stabilized by 1999.
93
  
 Other economic factors had a positive impact on the Estonian economy compared 
to Russia. Unemployment rates started falling in the mid-1990s as workers‟ wages 
increased. Estonia had a shortage of skilled labor which affected the economy especially 
in the years following independence.
94
 Although Estonia had a policy of a balanced 
budget, Estonia received its first credit ratings in 1997, along with Latvia, Hungary and 
Poland. Additionally, Estonia repaid its credits to the World Bank before its deadlines in 
1998.
95
  
b. Political Situation and Language Policy 
 Based on Freedom House reporting, Estonia is considering a free electoral 
democracy with three independent branches of government. The president, in contrast to 
the independent states of the former Soviet Union in Central Asia, is largely a ceremonial 
head of state and the prime minister is the head of the government. Approximately 10 
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percent of Estonia‟s Parliament members represent ethnic minorities and political parties 
are allowed to organize and operate freely in Estonia. All major political parties are 
represented in parliament.
96
 
 Although corruption was an issue at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, Estonia has ranked highly in Transparency International‟s rankings on perceived 
corruption since the mid-1990s indicating low levels of corruption. The judiciary is 
independent and rights of citizens are observed by the police. Governmental legislation 
and decisions are available online for public viewing and discussion and the internet is 
not restricted by the government, regardless of content. Freedom of the press is 
guaranteed by Estonia‟s constitution and guaranteed in practice as well. Additionally, 
freedom of assembly is not limited by the government except in cases where gatherings 
could inhibit public safety.
97
 
 In 1989, ethnic Russians comprised 30 percent of Estonia‟s population. In 2009, 
ethnic Russians made up 25.6 percent of Estonia‟s population, a 4.4 percent decrease 
from 1989 which is comparatively lower than Tajikistan, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.
98
 
Estonia‟s official language is Estonian, but the government allows Russian-language 
schools to operate freely. However, the government still promotes Estonian language and 
culture and in 2008, the government requested 60 percent Estonian instruction in 
Estonia‟s Russian-language public schools to transform monolingual schools into 
bilingual ones. Estonian laws require that teachers in public schools have a minimum 
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competency in Estonian and their ability can be tested since they are state employees.  
However, teachers are not fired if they fail the language test, but rather offered free 
Estonian language classes to improve their language skills.
99
 
 In order to qualify for citizenship, Estonian language skills must be demonstrated, 
a law that has proved controversial for Estonia‟s sizeable ethnic Russian minority. 
Anyone who has resided in Estonia since 1940 was eligible for automatic citizenship, but 
anyone arriving later had to qualify for citizen through a naturalization process which 
included the Estonian language test.
100
 As for public servants, anyone attempting to 
qualify for citizenship is eligible for government sponsored language courses.
101
 Ability 
to converse freely in Estonian is required for certain jobs such as government employees 
and medical personnel. Although some Russians allege that this law leads to employment 
discrimination, a 2008 survey indicated that Estonian language skills had improved 
amongst ethnic Russians and that the pay gap between Estonians and Russians had 
decreased.
102
 Despite restrictive language and citizenship laws, ethnic Russians and their 
interests are represented in parliament, a contrast to Central Asia‟s ethnic minorities. 
 Estonia and its Baltic neighbors became European Union and NATO members in 
2004, a process that had begun in 1995 when Estonia applied for EU membership. A free 
trade agreement with the EU had already come into force in 1994 and EU negotiations 
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with Estonia began in 1998. These negotiations lasted until 2002. In 2003 a referendum 
allowed Estonian citizens to vote on EU accession and Estonia became an EU member in 
2004 along with Latvia and Lithuania and other Central and Eastern European countries. 
In late 2007, Estonia joined the Schengen zone allowing visa-free travel throughout 
Europe and in 2011 Estonia adopted the Euro as its currency.
103
 
 Estonia‟s scores in the Freedom House and Transparency International measures 
can be found in the previous sections of the paper. The political rights score is shown on 
page 34; the civil liberties score is on page 35; the freedom of the press score is on page 
36; and Estonia‟s corruption perceptions index score is on page 37. In Table 11 below, the 
most important political and economic developments are listed by migration period. 
Initially after independence, Estonia offered no economic advantage to Russia based on 
the economic measures evaluated in this paper, but offered a political one.  
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Table 11: Migration, Political and Economic Developments in Estonia 
 Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Migration 
Rates 
9.32 
 
2.36 0.35 0.29 
Political 
Trends 
- Political rights 
score declines 
- Slight increase in 
civil liberties 
- Equal to Russia 
- Civil liberties 
scores stable 
- Improvement of 
civil liberties 
-Better than Russia 
politically 
- Civil liberties 
score improves in 
2004/corruption 
scores stable 
- Offers political 
advantage 
 
- Civil and 
political liberties 
scores stable 
- Corruption 
scores improve 
Economic 
Trends 
- High inflation/ 
banking crisis 
- Introduction of 
Estonian currency in 
- Strict language 
laws implemented 
- Worse than Russia 
economically 
- Trade agreement 
with EU begins 
- Negotiations with 
the EU begin 
- Higher 
unemployment than 
Russia, but higher 
GDP per capita 
- Estonia becomes 
an EU member in 
2004 
- Higher GDP per 
capita than Russia 
- EU becomes a 
member of the 
Schengen zone 
- Higher GDP 
per capita than 
Russia, but 
higher 
unemployment 
 
7. Conclusions and Projections 
 Korobkov‟s categorization does not account for certain instances of politically 
motivated migration. These political factors can include discriminatory language policy 
that obstructs members of the non-titular nationality access to education and employment 
opportunities, lack of political and civil liberties, civil conflict and political turbulence. 
Especially in cases where civil and political liberties, including the rule of law, freedom 
of the press, religion and assembly, democratic elections and open political party 
development are clearly declining or never existed, these factors are calculated against 
the economic backdrop to make a migration decision. Certain Central Asian and Baltic 
cases underscore the relevance of political factors to migration trends. However, in some 
cases, such as Tajikistan in periods three and four, where the political circumstances 
cannot explain migration, economic factors, including GDP growth, GDP per capita, 
unemployment rates and future economic prospective can offer insight to migration 
trends, which is congruent with Korobkov‟s analysis. 
Table 12: Average Migration Rates to Russia (per thousand) 
Country Period 1: 
1991-1995 
Period 2: 
1996-1999 
Period 3: 
2000-2004 
Period 4: 
2005-2009 
Kazakhstan 15.31 13.51 4.15 2.66 
Kyrgyzstan 14.12 3.10 2.25 3.92 
Tajikistan 10.42 4.23 1.04 2.23 
Estonia 9.32 2.36 0.35 0.29 
Source: Russian Demographic Yearbook (Демографический Ежегодник России) 
  
 In period two from 1996 through 1999, Kazakhstan‟s outmigration rates to Russia 
were higher than the other comparison countries, despite higher GDP growth in absolute 
terms compared to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, although still lower than Russia‟s (see 
Figure 4: GDP per capita in Central Asia, 1992-2010). This comparatively high migration 
rate speaks against an economic argument for this migration since Kazakhstan‟s GDP is 
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closest to Russia‟s in absolute terms. In the case of Kazakhstan, the shared border with 
Russia is a distinctive feature that supports also a proximity argument for migration 
rather than an economic one. Kazakhstan in period two is a country that does not fit into 
Korobkov‟s analysis since migration was still almost as high as period one and Korobkov 
argues that political migration dwindled in this period and economic reasons started 
becoming more important for migration. 
 Another country that is not accounted for in Korobkov‟s analysis is Estonia. In the 
turmoil of the political and economic transformation after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, migration rates from Estonia to Russia were comparable to those from Central 
Asia. By 1996, the second period, migration rates had slowed to less than a third of those 
from the initial period, and by 2000, migrations rates slowed to virtually zero and 
stabilized. Since independence Estonia has been ranked higher than the Central Asian 
states and Russia on political measures such as political liberties, civil liberties, 
corruption in the public sector and freedom of the press and had a faster economic 
recovery. The slowing migration rates also correspond with Estonia‟s negotiations on EU 
membership supporting the idea that despite some discriminatory language and 
citizenship policies, the political outlook in Estonia was better than Russia as a potential 
migration destination. Since Estonia offered no major economic advantage to Russia 
immediately after independence, relatively low migration rates to Russia indicates that 
migration (or a lack thereof) was politically motivated in period one. 
 The early years after independence showed a political gap between Central Asia 
and Russia. However, the political situation in Russia worsened over time to match the 
situation in Central Asia. These overall political trends indicate how Russia was an 
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appealing migration destination in the initial years following the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, but as political and civil liberties were encroached upon in Russia, the country lost 
some of its appeal. Simultaneously, political policy, especially strict language policy, 
which specifically targeted Russian speakers and members of non-titular ethnic group, 
presented another reason to migrate to Russia. Although not covered in the scope of this 
paper, the cases of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan where the strictest language policy was 
enacted and enforced, including alphabet changes, could lend support for migration due 
to political discrimination. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan‟s later leniency in language 
policy indicates that political elites believed language policy was a factor contributing to 
the outmigration of ethnic Russians. 
 Additionally, although migration policy changes could have decreased the push to 
Russia, lax enforcement meant that government policy had little effect on migration 
contrary to Korobkov‟s emphasis on migration policy in the Russian Federation in 
periods three and four. Although outmigration rates from Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
increased slightly, the rate from Kazakhstan actually decreased from period three to 
period four, contrary to Korobkov‟s argument. Liberalization of migration policy seemed 
to play little, if any, role in migration in periods three and four. Another potential 
explanation for Kyrgyzstan‟s increased migration in period four is the political upheaval 
brought upon by the Tulip Revolution since economic conditions did not drastically 
change in period four in Kyrgyzstan. 
 The importance of ethnic Russian migration can partially be addressed by 
calculating migration rates using the ethnic Russian population in the country as a base. 
Using these calculations (see Table 13 below), migration rates for certain countries seem 
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comparatively higher, such as from Tajikistan in period one. These migration rates differ 
from the original migration rates that were calculated based on the entire country‟s 
population in that they are calculated using the 1989 ethnic Russian population for each 
country as a base. Since 1989, Tajikistan has lost 78.8 percent of its ethnic Russian 
population, whereas Kyrgyzstan has lost only 23.8 percent and Kazakhstan has lost 40.9 
percent; Estonia‟s has decreased by 31.1 percent (see Table 5 for reference). Tajikistan‟s 
comparatively high loss indicates that the civil war played a role in the decision of ethnic 
Russians to migrate from Tajikistan back to Russia.  
Table 13: Migration rates based on ethnic Russian population, 1989 
Period: 1991-1995 1996-1999 2000-2004 2005-2009 
Kazakhstan 38.84  33.12  10.13  6.73  
Kyrgyzstan 69.25  15.86  12.19  22.52  
Tajikistan 147.40  63.54  16.72  39.33  
Estonia 30.75 7.78 1.15 0.97 
Source: 1989 Soviet census and the Russian Demographic Yearbook 
(Демографический Ежегодник России) 
  
 Tajikistan‟s GDP has declined in recent years. The 2006 GDP per capita is only 
85 percent of its 1990 levels and Tajikistan‟s population is growing quickly, from 5.3 
million in 1991 to 7.3 million in 2009. These changes have led to economic hardships 
including high unemployment rates and little economic opportunity. Tajikistan‟s initial 
migration seemed driven by political factors (thus often the migrants were not from the 
titular majority, but rather Russians, Germans, Uzbeks, etc.) because of the civil war. 
Following the war, economic reasons tended to guide the decision to migrate, as well as 
the increasing availability of social networks abroad to ease transitions and find jobs. 
Outmigration from Tajikistan is an example where Korobkov‟s argument is fitting 
because migration in periods one and two were motivated by ethnic and political factors, 
whereas periods three and four were motivated by economic ones. 
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 Korobkov also contends that the ethnic composition of outmigration from Central 
Asia in periods three and four is primarily from the titular majorities because ethnically 
motivated migration was exhausted. However, based on statistics from Rosstat (obtained 
through the 2008 IOM Russian migration report) for the years 2002 through 2006, of 
55,706 migrants from Kazakhstan in 2002, only 1,946 were ethnic Kazakh. For period 
four, of 38,606 migrants from Kazakhstan in 2006, only 1,862 were ethnic Kazakh. These 
numbers are similar for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, although the number of ethnic Tajiks 
was comparatively higher as a proportion of the migrant influx from Tajikistan. This 
ethnic composition of migration suggests that the officially recorded migrants were likely 
ethnic Russians or ethnic Slavs and not from the titular majorities especially since non-
Russian government sources such as the World Bank approximate that migration to the 
Russian Federation is much higher than these official data suggest.
104
 
 Large proportions of migrants from Central Asia in the later periods were still 
ethnic Russians and this outmigration suggests that ethnic factors still played a role in 
migration despite changes in language laws. The migrants that were more likely to be 
unrecorded in these later periods were more likely temporary labor migrants who could 
have become victims of trafficking and forced labor if they did not understand 
registration procedures and how to obtain a work permit. The ineffective migration policy 
in Russia needs to be addressed by Russian authorities for the protection of migrants‟ 
rights and for the sake of better official recording keeping as Korobkov recommends as 
the conclusion of his analysis on migration.  
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 Korobkov‟s categorization of migration serves as a useful analytical tool and with 
a deeper review of political and ethnic factors, this categorization can be improved. 
Korobkov contends that migration in periods one and two was politically motivated and 
by period three migration was primarily economically motivated. He also asserts that 
migration policy in the Russian Federation affected migration levels in the latter two 
periods. I contend that migration trends differ from Korobkov‟s analysis in some 
instances. Kazakhstan, for example, exhibits qualities of high politically based migration 
compared to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in period two. Estonia, although not included in 
Korobkov‟s classification, also has politically motivated migration in period one and the 
later lack of migration supports economic reasons as would fit into his categorization. 
Additionally, my analysis supports the argument that Korbokov overstated the 
importance of Russian migration policy and its effects on migration.  
 Overall, the interplay between ethnic, political and economic factors affecting 
migration does not consistently affect migration trends in the same way, although there 
are clear relationships between political and economic changes and migration. These 
factors are not reliably important in determining migration, but from time to time they 
can be used to describe migration motivations. Through this analysis, I have found 
evidence that ethnic and political factors impacted migration in these initial periods.  
There is also some evidence that economic factors play a more limited role in the latest 
period.  A suggestion for improvement on this analysis would be to use personal 
interviews and surveys of individuals who have migrated in the different periods to 
evaluate the significance of political, ethnic and economic considerations in their 
decision-making process.  
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APPENDIX 
Migration Inflows to the Russian Federation, 1992-1998 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Kazakhstan 183,891 195,672 346,363 241,427 172,860 235,903 209,880 
Kyrgyzstan 62,897 96,814 66,489 27,801 18,886 13,752 10,997 
Tajikistan 72,556 68,761 45,645 41,799 32,508 23,053 18,396 
Estonia 24,440 14,340 11,250 8,591 5,869 3,483 1,771 
Latvia 27,271 25,891 26,370 14,859 8,227 5,658 3,577 
Lithuania 15,354 19,407 8,456 4,126 3,055 1,785 1,384 
 
Migration Inflows to the Russian Federation, 2000-2006 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Kazakhstan 124,903 65,226 55,706 29,552 40,150 51,945 38,606 
Kyrgyzstan 15,536 10,740 13,139 6,948 9,511 15,592 15,669 
Tajikistan 11,043 6,742 5,967 5,346 3,339 4,717 6,523 
Estonia 786 535 534 445 446 432 347 
Latvia 1,785 1,283 990 906 819 726 766 
Lithuania 945 758 722 535 339 360 371 
 
Migration Inflows to the Russian 
Federation, 2007-2009 
 
2007 2008 2009 
Kazakhstan 40,258 39,964 38,830 
Kyrgyzstan 24,731 24,014 23,265 
Tajikistan 17,309 20,717 27,028 
Estonia 508 476 538 
Latvia 887 716 664 
Lithuania 537 455 443 
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